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A number of thorny issues such as the nature of time, free will, the clash of the manifest and scientific
images, the possibility of a naturalistic foundation of morality, and perhaps even the possibility of
accounting for consciousness in naturalistic terms, seem to me to be plagued by the conceptual
confusion nourished by a single fallacy: the old fisherman’s mistake.
I. THE OLD FISHERMAN
Once upon a time, an old fisherman used to
enjoy the sunset. The sky explodes in fiery
colours, the sun descends majestically and dives
into the ocean, the sky turns dark blue and one
by one the stars light-up.
But a man from the city came along and told
the old fisherman: “You know: the sun does
not really dive into the ocean. It stands still
out there and is always shining. What you see is
only a perspectival show due to our movement.”
The old fisherman was stunned. He trusted
the man from the city and began to worry. The
sunset is an illusion. Hence it is not real. He had
been watching a non-existing event for years.
He was deluded all his life.
If the sunset is an illusion —he thought— we
cannot rely upon it. We have to learn to think
without sunsets. He tried, and it was a disaster:
he did not know when to go to sleep anymore,
he did not expect a sunset in the evening, and
if he saw one, he repeated to himself: “It is
an illusion, it is not real, there is no sunset, the
sun never dives into the ocean: the sun is always
shining, I should take this seriously, I should not
go to sleep.” So, he couldn’t sleep anymore; he
lost his mind.
The old man was obviously making a mis-
take. It seems a simple one, but it is a subtle
one. I find precisely this same mistake repeated
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over and over in a number of domains. I think
that this mistake confuses the discussion on a
number of thorny and much debated issues. I
describe what precisely the mistake is, and I
suggest that recognizing it could make a num-
ber of those issues a bit less troublesome.
II. THE FALLACY
The question bothering the old fisherman is
whether the sunset is real or illusory. On the
one hand, the reality of the sunset is denied by
the knowledge of the city man, which the old
fisherman trusts. On the other hand, denying
the reality of the sunset appears ridiculous and
leads the old man to absurd and dramatic de-
ductions. Where is the catch?
The catch is in the meaning of the concept
“sunset”. The old man grew up with a clear-
cut notion of what a sunset is:
(a) The sunset is the diving of the sun into
the water of the ocean.
This, for the old fisherman, was what a sun-
set is. Its very nature. Its definition. The very
meaning of the concept “sunset”. A careful con-
ceptual analysis of his notion of sunset would
have identified it with the dive of the sun into
the ocean. When the old fisherman is told that
the sun does not dive into the ocean, the un-
avoidable conclusion is that there is no sunset.
But the rest of us, who know our Coperni-
cus, are still very happy to talk about sunsets.
We rely upon sunsets, we enjoy sunsets, and
it would not even cross our mind to state that
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there is no sunset in our Universe. Why?
Because —here is the key point— we have re-
conceptualized the notion of “sunset” adjusting
it to our increased knowledge. Say:
(b) A sunset is the collection of real phenom-
ena happening around us when the rotation of
the Earth moves us out of the lit part of the
globe.
Let us assign different names to these two def-
initions: (a) defines “sunset-(a)” while (b) de-
fines “sunset-(b)”. The knowledge of the man
of the city denies the reality of sunset-(a), but
not the reality of sunset-(b). So, a reasonable
reaction by the old fisherman should have been
something like: “Oh gosh, I always thought that
the sunset I used to watch was a sunset-(a),
but this is not true. The sunsets I saw were all
sunsets-(b).” But sunsets-(b) provide the very
same vision of the sun majestically descending
towards the ocean, the sky exploding in fiery
colours, the sky turning dark blue and one by
one the stars lighting up and so on. Further-
more, sunsets-(b) equally stir emotions, they
equally tell the time to go to bed, they are as re-
liable in their recurrence as sunsets have always
been. Hence the notion of sunset can play ex-
actly the same role as before in the fisherman’s
life, even if according to his strict definition (a)
there are no sunsets at all.
Summarizing: there is a concept (“sunset”)
that plays an important role in the old fisher-
man life. He naturally understands this notion
as sunset-(a). But sunsets-(a), he finds out, do
not exist in nature. However, sunsets-(b) do ex-
ist, and they play precisely the role that sunsets
have always played all along his life. No trouble
follows in replacing the definition (a) with the
definition (b), and using the notion of sunset
just as before. Believing that there is trouble is
the mistake that the old fisherman makes.
Let’s draw the general lesson from the para-
ble. There are concepts that play an important
role in our dealing with the world. We can have
a good conceptual understanding of them. We
know what they mean. But it happens that in-
creased knowledge about the structure of the
world shows us that our understanding of the
phenomena they designate contains something
incorrect. However, there is a modification of
the same concept that does play precisely the
role as the original concept played. No trouble
follows in replacing the old understanding with
the new one.
Believing there is trouble is the old fisher-
man’s mistake.
In the next section I illustrate how precisely
this mistake plays out in a number of current
debates. Before getting to that, however, one
more observation may be useful. The account
above may not capture the full story yet.
Some old fishermen are stubborn guys. Our
old fisherman may well end up understanding
all of the above, but still feel a sense of loss. Af-
ter all, he was emotionally attached to the idea
of the sun actually diving into the water. He
could almost visualize the splashes and the boil-
ing around the sun immersing into the waves.
So, he may mourn the loss of sunsets-(a).
This might be psychologically comprehensi-
ble, and we would be culturally insensitive to
deny him the right to his loss. We may feel
sorry for him, and perhaps even empathize a
bit with him.
This is comprehensible. But if the old man
fails to see that sunsets-(b) are real and if he
denies that they are fully entitled to play the
vast amount of functions that “sunset” used to
play for his life, then he is clearly just mistaken.
III. EXAMPLES
In the following, I list a number of issues that
are debated today, sometimes fiercely. I do not
pretend to offer conclusive solutions to all of
them, perhaps nor even to say anything par-
ticularly original about them. My point is to
notice what seems to me to be a common fal-
lacy in the way all these issues are sometimes
addressed.
Needless to stay, not all the authors involved
in these debates fall in this fallacy. The fallacy
is well recognized by some players in each of the
debates. My aim here is to point out that it is
the very same fallacy that creates confusion in




We have the distinct experience of being able
to make decisions that are free: they depend on
us. Moral responsibility, legal theory, and our
own understanding of ourselves rely upon the
idea that the source of some decisions is the in-
dividual, who therefore bears responsibility for
the decisions taken. A naive way we can think
about the nature of free will is the following:
(a) We have the power to steer the future
along different paths, in a way that is not due
to random chance, and without different future
paths implying any difference at all in the past
state of the world (including ourselves).
Call this “free-will-(a)”. Now, the man from
town, incarnated into modern physics, tells us
that free-will-(a) is incompatible with the laws
of nature. In the classical limit, different futures
require different pasts. In quantum physics, the
past fully determines the probability distribu-
tions of future events.
Like the old fisherman, we panic. If there is
no free will, our idea of ourselves crumbles. We
agonize. We oscillate between trusting science
or remaining faithful to our deep intuition about
our freedom. We fear the scientific advances
to jeopardize the very foundation of our legal
system and our morality.
It is the same panic as the old fisherman’s.
Consider a possible definition of free-will-(b).
Say:
(b) At a given state of the external world,
with given external stimuli and given internal
memories, our future actions are still not deter-
mined. They are affected by complex mental
process, carried on by the physical system that
we are.
Nothing in modern science denies the exis-
tence of free-will-(b), of course. (See for in-
stance [Dennett 1984]). Free-will-(b) is per-
fectly sufficient to underpin our sense of internal
freedom, our legal system and our morality; it
justifies our sense that it is us who decide, and
it accounts for all phenomena that we tradition-
ally attribute to free will.
For instance, to the extent legal theory re-
quires a notion of free choice, free-will-(b) is
largely sufficient. We incarcerate persons on
the basis of the assumption that their mental
processes have led to crime in contexts and un-
der circumstances where other people would not
have done the same. This notion of choice is
coherent with free-will-(b). Whether we hold
a dissuasive, a punitive, a redeeming, or a
vengeance motivation for incarceration, in all
these cases, the reality of free-will-(b) suffices
not only to define legal responsibility, but also
provide the rational motivation for incarcera-
tion in the concrete cases in which free choice is
invoked. (I touch on moral responsibility later
on.)
Furthermore, it is also fully comprehensible
why our (free, in the sense just clarified!) deci-
sions have lead us to establish laws accordingly.
Hence, there is no contradiction between any of
this and modern science. To think that there is
a contradiction is the old fisherman mistake.
Of course there is more. Remember that the
old fishermen, stubborn guy, could still feel a
sense of loss at the idea that the sun is not ac-
tually diving in the ocean with a splash. In the
same vein, some of us, stubborn guys, may feel a
sense of loss for free-will-(a), namely for the loss
of the idea that something in us is external to
the natural realm, and can influence it from the
outside. This fact may be hard to swallow for
some. During the Renaissance, some found it
hard to swallow the loss of an immovable Earth.
To this, I see no remedy but mourning.
But the point I am making is a different one:
there is no contradiction between the reality of
the phenomena we commonly denote “free will”,
with the full use we make of this concept, in-
cluding in our psychology, morality and law,
and the discoveries of science. The reason to
think that there is a contradiction is the old
fisherman fallacy: failing to distinguish a rigid
(mistaken) understanding of a concept, from the
actual (fluid) role that it plays within our over-
all conceptual structure.
To learn is to adjust our concepts, not to be
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enslaved by the way we intend them at some
moment of time.
B. Manifest and scientific image of the
world
The example of the old fisherman is a special
case of the supposed tension between the “man-
ifest” and the “scientific” image of the world
[Sellars 1962]. A piece of matter appears to
be continuous, while science tells us that it is
mostly empty and just scattered with atoms.
The ground appears static, while the Earth is
spinning.
The clash between the two images is easily
resolved in the way illustrated above: realizing
that that the manifest image is neither “illu-
sory”, nor in contradiction with the underlying
complexity revealed by scientific research.
The error is to mistake an appearance for a
definition. We have analogous situations in ev-
eryday life: seen from a distance, a forest along
the side of a mountain appears as a uniform vel-
vet green. This is a “manifest” image of a forest.
But if I walk into the forest, I see trees, trunks,
leaves, insects – a rich complexity. Does this
make the “uniform velvet green” illusory? Does
this create a conflict? It does not. Things look
one way seen from a distance and another way
seen from close. The “scientific image of the
world” does not clash with the manifest image,
it is a more detailed perspective on the same ob-
jects. It does not falsify the manifest image: it
grounds it, like the perspectival understanding
of a sunset explains the image of the sun diving
into the ocean.
Once again, it is the analysis of the meaning
of our words that can be misleading. If we define
a table as
(a) a continuous piece of wood,
we are posing continuity to be part of the con-
ceptual definition of matter. Then we get end-
lessly confused in learning atomic theory. But
if we are flexible in redefining what we mean by
continuous matter at the light of the advances
of science between the XIX and the XX century,
there is no tension between the continuous sur-
face of a table and its atomic structure. A table
is simply
(b) an atomic structure that is continuous at
scales much larger than the atomic scale.
The mistake of believing there is a clash is
to take the manifest image as the definition of
reality, instead of taking it, as we should, as a
provisional, approximate, effective, useful level
of conceptualization of reality, to be kept flexi-
ble in view of the development of knowledge.
C. The nature of time
I focus here on one specific aspect (among
the many) of the debate on the nature of time:
orientation, or “the arrow of time”. The macro-
scopic world we experience is time-oriented. We
witness phenomena that we never see happen-
ing in time-reversed order. Hence our naive in-
tuition about time is that it is necessarily ori-
ented. Here is a possible definition of what time
is:
(a) Time is an oriented flow.
However, science has discovered that all el-
ementary evolution equations are time rever-
sal invariant: if a phenomenon happens, the
phenomenon obtained by time reversing it is
allowed by these equations to happen as well
[Price 1996].
If, like the old fisherman, we think that time
is by nature oriented (as in definition (a) above),
we are confused by finding out that irreversibil-
ity is a contingent fact regarding a macroscopic
description of events, due to entropy happening
to be low in the past. If we hold on to defini-
tion (a), we deduce that there is no time. We
panic. We see a dramatic clash between mi-
crophysics and experience. Shall we believe in
microphysics and declare that our entire expe-
rience of the unidirectional flow of time is illu-
sory? Should we hold on to the cogency of our
experience and alter the microphysics? Should
we declare current physics incomplete, because
it does not include time-(a) in its foundations?
None of the above is necessary. We are mak-
ing the old fisherman’s mistake. We fail to rec-
ognize that we are indicating two different no-
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tions with the same name. There are a more
refined notion of time useful to describe elemen-
tary dynamics, where time is not fundamentally
oriented, while orientation appears only in the
macroscopic account of phenomena. Say:
(b) Time is an independent parameter in the
equations of motion, in terms of which the
macroscopic account of physical phenomena in
our universe turns out to be irreversible.
Time-(b) accounts for our experience, hence
justifies our intuition, underpins all irreversible
phenomena of the world, and is compatible with
current microphysics. There is no tension.
Once again, some of us, stubborn guys, will
keep mourning for the lost notion of a funda-
mental oriented time. Ok for the mourning.
But to argue that a fundamental orientation
of time (independent from the macroscopic ap-
proximation) is required to make sense of our
experience of the word, is like arguing that the
sun truly splashing into the ocean’s waves is re-
quired for the sunset we see.
D. The possibility of a naturalistic
foundation of values
I touch a wider theme: the possibility of a
naturalistic foundation of values, such as moral
ones. Values can be held and studied by them-
selves and as such. But in the context of a nat-
uralistic worldview, we can also ask for an un-
derstanding of how they relate to –say – biology,
natural evolution, cultural evolution, or similar
[Darwin 1871]. In this context, one considers
the natural origin of values. In this context they
are not literally undersigned by God, they are
not absolute Kantian imperatives, they are not
valid by their abstract nature.
Here I am not concerned with the extent spe-
cific accounts of the natural origin of values are
convincing. Rather, I am interested in a surpris-
ingly widespread reaction to any such account:
the idea that it empties the significance or the
cogency of the values themselves, either because
it relativizes them, or because it undercuts their
supposed foundation. The point I want to make
here is only that this reaction is another exam-
ple of the old fisherman’s mistake.
To put it pictorially, let me consider a wiser
man than the fisherman of the initial story, one
that does not panic so easily. This wise man
loves his children and helps the poor. When
asked why he does so, he answers: because this
is what God wants from me. But one day the
man from the city ends up convincing him that
the reason he loves his children and helps the
poor is because of his biology.
The old man listens carefully, thinks for
awhile and then says: “It may be so, as you
say, but I still love my children, and I still help
the poor.”
What has happened to him? He has simply
allowed for the possibility of re-conceptualizing
a real phenomenon, his morality, by changing
his definition from:
(a) Love and charity are what God asks me
to do,
to
(b) Love and charity are what I do because
of my nature and culture.
The denial of the reality of (a) does not imply
that the phenomenology of love and charity is
false or ill founded, mistaken or illusory. It re-
mains real, because it can be re-conceptualized,
due to a change of general cultural context.
Whether (a) or (b) are more compelling depends
on the cultural context, of course.
If in the same situation the wise man had pan-
icked: “Oh Gosh, if there is no God telling me
what to do, there is no morality”, he would have
committed the old fisherman’s mistake. This
is the reaction illustrated by Dostoyevski in a
renown passage of Brother Karamazov, which
well represents the entire (misplaced) rhetoric
against the supposed XX century “nihilism”.
The mistake is to be stubbornly anchored to
an interpretation of a rich phenomenology –
morality– in terms of a strict definition of this
phenomenology that relies on incomplete knowl-
edge.
The remarks above allow us to consider the
question whether moral responsibility (as op-
posed to legal responsibility) depend on free-
will-(a). Is it put in jeopardy by the determin-
ism of classical physics or the random probabil-
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ism of quantum physics? As mentioned above,
we can consider values, including moral values,
as such, or study the coherence of the ensemble
of moral phenomena with a naturalistic world
view. In the first case, there is nothing wrong
assuming free-will-(a): we are in the context of
an incomplete account or reality, and within this
account choice can be coherently taken as liter-
arily un-caused. If instead we enquire about
the compatibility between free will and modern
science, we are doing something else: we are
placing [Price 2011] the moral discourse within
a naturalistic worldview. Once again, there is
no contradiction, because any naturalistic ac-
count of morality refers to free-will-(b), not to
free-will-(a). The confusion comes only if we
pretend the second to remain valid outside the
context where we can use it.
E. Consciousness
Finally, I find that the same fallacy informs
the debate about consciousness. Chalmers’ well
known distinction between the “easy” and the
“hard” problem of consciousness is rooted in
this fallacy [Chalmers 1996].
There are substantial differences with the sit-
uation of the old fisherman, and the previous
cases. In the case of the sunset, for instance, we
have the “easy” problem fully solved: Coperni-
can theory. In the case of consciousness we are
far from an equally solid understanding of the
phenomena.
But the recurring claim that there necessar-
ily is a “hard” problem, over and above the un-
solved “easy” problem, is to base the very for-
mulation of the issue on a conceptual analysis
of what it means for us to be conscious. Our in-
tuition is that —whatever the phenomena— to
be conscious must be something over and above
whatever process is happening in the brain.
Chalmers’ key argument, for instance, is the
zombie argument: the same brain processes
that happen together with a subjective expe-
rience can also be conceived to happen in the
absence of this subjective experience. But why
could one conceive this to happen? One can
conceive this to happen only if one holds on to
a conceptual understanding of ourselves as en-
tities independent from the physical processes
in the brain (“consciousness-(a)”). It is the
presumed understanding that implies that we
can conceive the separation between brain and
mind.
A claim is made that we know directly the
intrinsic nature of consciousness by being con-
scious, so we couldn’t be mistaken about its na-
ture. Centuries of advances in knowledge teach
us that there are no intuitions we can’t be mis-
taken about. This, I believe, is precisely what
naturalism is all about
It may well be true that consciousness-(a) is
incompatible with the current naturalistic ac-
count of the world, but this is no argument
against the possibility that the “easy” problem
could lead to an understanding of brain pro-
cesses where a “consciousness-(b)” concept can
account for the full experience of subjectivity.
In simpler words, the intuition that authors
like Chalmers of Nagel [Nagel 2012] defend is
just what it is: an intuition promoted to a def-
inition, or a certainty. Like the intuition of the
old fisherman, also promoted to a definition,
that the very nature of sunset is the sun splash-
ing into the ocean.
Intuitions turn out to be wrong. Especially
when they find themselves in ever-increasing
contrast with everything we are learning about
the natural world.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The old fisherman’s mistake is failing to un-
derstand that strict definitions based on a care-
ful conceptual analysis of the way we think
and the way we speak become misleading once
knowledge increases.
In a sense, all this is trivial. After all, if we
just define things carefully, everything goes in
order. Sunset-(a) has a different definition from
sunset-(b); free-will-(a) has a different definition
from free-will-(b) and so on. The mistake is the
blindness to these distinction.
The subtle point is that a complex phe-
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nomenology (sunset, free will, flowing of time,
consciousness,...) is commonly named, then
rigidly characterized by a concept. But the con-
cept so generated does not refer solely to the
phenomenology: it also refers to an understand-
ing we have of this phenomenology, which at
the light of increased knowledge turns out to be
wrong. The confusion comes because we con-
fuse the part of the definition that refers to the
phenomenology from the part that depends on
our wrong beliefs.
There is no pure phenomenology independent
from our general conceptual structure. The
other way around, it seems to me that we have
learned, at least since Quine, if not since the sec-
ond Wittgenstein, that there is no concept that
may not be challenged by empirical knowledge.
The historical growth of knowledge has repeat-
edly shown us that concepts that seemed “clear
and distinct”, and appropriate, can in fact turn
out to be inadequate. The pre-relativistic con-
cept of “simultaneity”, or the pre-Copernican
concept of “motion” turned out just to be inad-
equate.
The moral is that to understand is to recog-
nize that we have to modify concepts, not only
to clarify and combine them. Howard Stein
expresses this point beautifully [Stein 2004]:
“This mistake is the assumption that a clarifica-
tion of ‘ideas’, or concepts, should always or can
always – precede the advance of knowledge.”
And: “the two enterprises, that of knowledge
and that of understanding, are inextricably in-
tertwined”. Where “ ‘understanding’ here re-
fer[s] to the grasp of ideas, or concepts”. The
formulation of the useful concepts may come
after knowledge, not before it, because “old”
concepts may be internally plagued by wrong
knowledge.
Once this is clear we have always two options.
The first option is to keep a name attached to
the inadequate comprehension and say, for in-
stance, that there is no sunset, there is no free
will, there is no time, there is not table, there is
no consciousness: these are “illusions”. This is
correct, if we take these names to indicate their
(a)-version.
But there is also the second alternative: there
are sunsets, there is free will, there is time, there
are tables, there is consciousness; they are just
what their (b)-version implies.
What we decide to indicate by a world is con-
ventional, and whether we take the first or the
second option is a matter of convenience, not
substance. (If I thought that the shadows in my
room where ghosts, and then realize they were
casts by branches outside the window, I may
prefer to drop the ghost language altogether
and call it illusory, rather than reinterpreting
“ghosts” as “shadows of the branches”.) But to
believe that there is a problem is the old fisher-
man mistake.
This implies that (taking the second option)
concepts that we use can play the full spec-
trum of their role, and still denote what they
used to denote (sunsets, forests, pieces of mat-
ter, oriented time, values, moral imperatives,
subjective experience,...), even if we change our
understanding of what they actually refer to,
namely if we redefine them taking into account
increased knowledge. We got confused because
we took them rigidly.
“But this is not what I mean by sunset!” an-
swers the old fisherman to anybody trying to
talk him out of this confusion by illustrating
what sunsets really are.
“But this is not what I mean by free will,
by time, by morality, by consciousness” an-
swers the philosopher who resists what science
is teaching us about the nature of time or the
functioning of ourselves. And this answer is ex-
actly right. The problem is that to remain an-
chored to “this is what I mean by” is to refuse
to take away the screen that blinds us from the
comprehension of the actual phenomena that
we witness.
It is not the nature of the real sunset to have
the sun splashing in the water, it is not the na-
ture of our actual freedom to be independent
form the natural order, it is not the nature of
natural time to be necessarily oriented, it not in
the nature of real continuous matter to be con-
tinuous at any scale, it is not in the nature of
the actual moral behaviour of people or in the
nature of actual subjective experience to be un-
accountable in terms of known elementary laws.
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Using this language, we can say that it is not
that sunsets, free will, tables, consciousness, the
oriented flow of time, etcetera are “illusory”.
They are perfectly real. What is an illusion
is that a sunset is literally the sun diving in
the waves, free will is literally an external in-
tervention above physical evolution, and so on.
Which is how we (mistakenly) might “intend”
these phenomena.
Conceptual analysis in the sense of precise
clarification of what we now intend by the con-
cepts we use can become dangerously mislead-
ing, as soon as we learn something new.
The reason is that knowledge is not just learn-
ing new facts about our old concepts. It is often
to realise the inadequacy and misleading char-
acter of some of our old concepts, and the intu-
itions that ground them.
I find surprising that a single specific fallacy
nourishes the confusion around so many issues.
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